Review–Science and Pseudoscience in Clinical Psychology

In presidential address to section III of division 12 in APA, McFall (1991) articulated the principle that “scientific clinical psychology is the only legitimate and acceptable form in clinical psychology.” While underpinning this principle, Lilienfeld et al. (2003) show the fear that scientific foundations in clinical psychology are eroding due to proliferation of scientifically unproven or questionable theories and techniques. The notion that clinical psychologists and practitioners, who are accountable for public health, should not apply pseudoscientific techniques is both desirable and indisputable. With regard to differentiating science from pseudoscience, however, the authors lead readers to keep questioning. 

Lelienfeld et al. gather essences of science from several scientists and philosophers. From original standpoints, the authors incorporate these essences into indicators of pseudoscience. Most indicators, which imply a scientist’s attitudes, are convincing. Nonetheless, whether psychologists can make use of falsification as a criterion for sorting out pseudoscience is questionable. When scientists apply strictly falsification from Popper’s standpoint, the range of science would get narrower (Pigliucci, 2010). In fact, Popper (1974) describes the psychoanalytic theories of Freud pseudoscientific and calls psychology qua science. Even Bunge (2006), who submits several features of science beyond falsification, classifies psychology as semi-science. Although this classification does not indicate that psychology is pseudoscientific, it implies that psychological science has characteristics different from hard science like physics. A question derives from this point. Is it reasonable to employ falsification from Popper’s standpoint, which could bring about controversy, when psychologists judging theories and techniques in psychology for weeding out pseudoscience? The authors render ad hoc hypothesis, which derives from falsification, instead of directly suggesting falsification as a criterion. This confusing inquiry leads another question. How precisely can scientists tell science from pseudoscience? McNally (2003) points out that the boundary between science and pseudoscience is not clear-cut. Although Pigliucci appreciates attributes of science, he also notes that “science is characterized by fuzzy borderline with other types of inquiry that may or may not one day become science.”  This comes up with the concern that imprudent classification can lead science to dogmatism. Hence, despite fatal consequences of pseudoscience, it does not look advantageous to sort out pseudoscience according to criteria which entails controversy.

Considering history of psychology, move to pursue science like EST (Empirically Supported Treatment) movement which looks like self-defensive response is reasonable. Nonetheless, emphasis on research and practice based on empirical evidence entails a concern. The emphasis tends to reduce scientific knowledge to method like experiment in laboratory. History of science illustrates that sifting science according to strict criteria or community interest could impede new findings. As heliocentric theory, theory of relativity, and studies of brain plasticity show, new evidence has overturned established beliefs. On the other hand, some theories of philosophy of mind, which mainly deal with unobservable phenomena which rarely provided empirical evidences, have evolved toward cognitive science due to findings from neuroscience (e.g., Schwartz’s therapy for OCD). Those examples don’t justify the fact that clinicians practice based on questionable techniques which might bring about harm, nor do the examples deny that there is distinctive quality of science. Psychology is recognized as a soft science because it deals with “complex layers of causality” different from hard science (Pigliucci). From this perspective, too much emphasis on empirical evidence, especially randomly controlled trials, might distort characteristics of psychology, which involves human behavior and mental process with complex layers of causality. 

References

Bunge, M. (2006). The philosophy behind pseudoscience. Skeptical Inquirer, 30 (4), 19-27.

McFall, R. M. (1991). Manifesto for a science of clinical psychology. Clinical Psychologist, 44, 75-88.

McNally, R. J. (2003). The demise of pseudoscience. The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice, 2 (2).
Pigliucci, M. (2010). Nonsense on stilts: How to tell science from bunk. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press
Popper, K. R. (1974). Intellectual autobiography. In P. A. Schilpp. (Ed.), The philosophy of Karl Popper (3-181). La Salle, IL: The Open Court Publishing.
Schwartz, J. M., & Begley, S. (2002). The mind and the brain: Neuroplasticity and the power of mental force. New York, NY: HarperCollins.

Young, L. J. (2005). EST, MCE, MCC: The abbreviating of psychology. Retrieved from http://www.academyprojects.org/young.html